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Abstract
This paper devises and tests a statistical model (the PAM) to measure the financial
and sporting performance of professional football clubs. The PAM has been applied to a longitudinal data set of English football clubs (21 clubs between 1992–
2013) to identify trends in performance. The results show that a small number of
clubs have created an imbalance within English football and that there has been
evidence of a “financial crisis” at individual clubs. For the majority of clubs, overall
performance appears to vary over time in cycles. In addition to measuring holistic
performance of professional football clubs in England, the paper has developed a
statistically robust model that progresses research in the field. This new model has
the potential to be adapted to fit other professional team sports to test league viability. It can also be used by the clubs themselves to set objectives and to analyse
performance against competitors.
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Holistic Performance of EPL Clubs

Contemporary sporting competition involves an abundance of statistics;
whether it is the number of goals scored in a match, the number of points accumulated by a team during a league season, the time recorded by a sprinter in
a race, or the number of medals won by a country during the Olympic Games.
As such, sport is an ideal laboratory in which to test various economic theories
(Sloane, 2015). Such statistics need not be exclusively confined to the field of play.
Indeed, as the field of sports economics has grown since Sloane’s seminal article
on the objectives of football clubs (1971), there has been increasing interest among
academics surrounding the off-field objectives and performance of, most notably,
professional football clubs across Europe.
This interest has been stimulated, in part at least, by substantial increases
in revenue in European football in recent years. In 2013–2014, the cumulative
revenue of the “big five” European leagues (the English Premier League in England, the Bundesliga in Germany, La Liga in Spain, Serie A in Italy, and Ligue 1 in
France) grew 15% to €11.3 billion, driving the total European football market beyond €20 billion (Deloitte, 2015). However, despite these positive revenue figures,
Drut and Raballand (2012) state that debt accumulation of European football
clubs is an increasing source of concern for football authorities. Of the five major
European leagues, the English Premier League (the EPL) remains, by a distance,
the highest revenue-generating league (€3.9 billion in 2013–2014). This figure is
€1.6 billion more than the next best revenue-generating league in Europe (the
Bundesliga in Germany), and during the last five years, the EPL has established
itself as the league with the highest turnover in world football. At individual club
level, however, the figures are less positive. With reference to the EPL, financial
data shows that clubs are leveraged by significant levels of debt, often in the form
of interest-free loans from their owners. In 2014, the total debt of EPL clubs was
€3.3 billion with “soft loans” from owners totalling €2.3 billion (Deloitte, 2015).
Despite EPL clubs’ revenue totalling €3.9 billion, clubs are spending €2.6 billion
(72%) on wages, and academics have confirmed similar imbalances between revenue and costs for clubs across Europe in recent years (see Andreff, 2007; Ascari
& Gagnepain, 2007; Barros, 2006; Buraimo, Simmons, & Syzmanski, 2006; Dietl
& Franck, 2007; Dimitropoulos, 2010; Plumley, Wilson, & Ramchandani, 2014;
Wilson, Plumley, & Ramchandani, 2013).
In an attempt to address this imbalance, the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) has introduced Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations across the
European game in an attempt to reduce the reliance on debt and borrowings and
to make clubs spend within their means. The cornerstone of UEFA’s FFP regulations is the break-even requirement, which aims to help clubs across Europe
achieve a more sustainable balance between their costs and revenues while also
encouraging investment for the longer-term benefit of football. The regulations,
applied in UEFA competitions for the first time in 2013–2014, cover clubs’ results
from the 2011–2012 and 2012–2013 seasons, and there have recently been high2
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profile examples of fines handed to clubs who have not fulfilled the break-even
requirement, such as Manchester City in England and Paris St. Germain in France.
The advent of UEFA FFP has brought about an increase in pressure on clubs
to become more financially prudent and sustainable. Additionally, the effect of
investment and ownership structure within clubs is also being analysed as part
of FFP (see Wilson et al., 2013). Surrounding these areas is the issue of how we
assess the long-term viability of professional sports leagues and the future proofing of individual businesses, as arguably, from a fundamental business position,
professional sports teams should be looking to operate as sustainable businesses
focusing on long-term growth as opposed to seeking short-term gain and trophy
acquisition through immediate cash injections. The problem with sports teams,
however, is that they are ultimately guided by twin objectives. One is financial,
in relation to business operations, and the other is sporting, in relation to onpitch performance and trophy success. This strategic dilemma is a product of the
phrase “peculiar economics” in relation to professional team sports as described
in the seminal paper by Neale (1964). Central to this dilemma are the principles of
competitive balance, uncertainty of outcome, and profit and utility maximisation;
all underlying themes present in contemporary sports economics literature (e.g.,
Buraimo, Frick, Hickfang, & Simmons, 2015; Fort, 2015; Kesenne, 2015; Leach
& Szymanski, 2015; Sloane, 2015; Vrooman, 2015). In addition to measuring financial performance, academics have also examined the relationship between financial and sporting performance and whether or not the two concepts are interlinked or mutually exclusive.
Consequently, this paper reports on a new approach to performance measurement in professional team sports. The paper uses football, and the EPL, as
an example, and while the model presented is exclusive to football at the present
time, it has the potential to be adapted to fit other professional team sports, particularly those in England. The model builds on UEFA’s approach to FFP, and can
be used by academics, practitioners, and analysts to draw conclusions about club
performance. It is important to note that the model is not used as a predictor for
future performance, rather it is an analytical tool that can be used to check for
performance health markers (both financial and sporting) to detect where clubs
may be considered at risk. It outlines a composite index score that highlights how
a club is performing in relation to its competitors. This paper outlines the formation of the model by first highlighting the key areas of literature and conceptual
framework before discussing an exploratory pilot model that subsequently led to
the production of the Performance Assessment Model (PAM) for football clubs
following a test for the relationship between variables. The paper then utilises the
PAM to evaluate the performance of English football clubs since the inception of
the EPL in 1992 and concludes by discussing the findings in relation to the extant
literature and the model’s contribution to knowledge in the field of sport business
management.
3
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Literature Review and Theoretical Context
The Economic Theory of Professional Sports Leagues
Professional team sports are intrinsically different from other businesses, in
which a firm is likely to prosper if it can eliminate competition and establish a
position as a monopoly supplier (Dobson & Goddard, 2011). In sport, however,
it does not pay for one team to establish such a position due to the joint nature of
“production” in sports. The theoretical literature on the determinants of the degree of competitive inequality in sports leagues was first developed by U.S. sports
economists, with North American team sports primarily in mind. Naturally, the
development of this literature has led to comparisons between the North American and European model (see Hoehn & Szymanski, 1999; Andreff & Staudohar,
2000; Sloane, 2006; Szymanski, 2003). The European model is and will remain
unique, but there appears to be convergence on certain features. In both Europe
and the United States, we have seen the emergence of joint ventures that can be
viewed as a single entity. Clubs are separately owned with discretion to set prices,
market the games, and adopt strategies to compete with other clubs. There are,
however, several key differences between the two models, all of which ultimately
impinge on factors such as revenue generation and ability to compete. Firstly, the
American sports model operates a draft system where the best performing rookie is assigned to the worst performing team. Furthermore, two American sports
leagues operate under salary caps, share television revenue equally, and compete
exclusively in domestically structured leagues (aside from a handful of Canadian
franchises) (Andreff & Staudohar, 2000). In place of promotion and relegation,
evident throughout the European model, changes in American leagues come from
adding new franchises and relocating franchises to different cities.
Precisely why such differences have arisen in the two continents has never been
fully explained (Sloane, 2015). However, Szymanski and Zimbalist (2005) contrast the development of baseball and soccer, with the latter spreading throughout
the world, first under the influence of British expatriates and then by local elites,
whereas baseball was much more inward looking and concerned with commercial
development. Historically, the North American model of professional team sports
has been argued to be closer to the profit maximisation end of a continuum, with
the European model more closely linked to the utility maximisation end (Andreff,
2011) although Markham and Teplitz (1981), Fort and Quirk (2004), and Zimbalist (2003) refute these claims. Markham and Teplitz (1981) argued that some owners seek “playing success while remaining solvent” while others suggest that without detailed information on revenue functions, it is hard to make comparisons
about profit or win maximisation choices. Various papers have also suggested that
the European sports model is more closely related to utility or “win” maximisation (see Garcia-del-Barro & Szymanski, 2009; Kesenne, 2000; Sloane, 1971). Furthermore, Zimbalist (2003) found little convincing evidence distinguishing prof4
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it-maximising behaviour from any other and concluded that “owners maximise
global long-term returns” and that these are very different from a team’s reported
operating profits. Zimbalist (2003) further argues that, in relation to American
team sports, it is almost certain that different owners give different weights to the
variety of arguments in their objective management functions. The omission of
features such as salary caps and revenue sharing in the European model alongside
a lack of regulation in the first instance ultimately gave rise to the inception of
the EPL in 1992, which saw the most powerful clubs at the time break away and
form their own league where they were able to negotiate their own broadcasting
and sponsorship deals, sell them to the highest bidders, and retain the revenue for
themselves. Furthermore, they were able to allocate these revenues as they saw fit.
Measuring Performance in Professional Team Sports
Reconciling the “on-field/off field” dichotomy in professional team sport is
not easy, and it has proved a highly contentious issue in recent years (Chadwick,
2009). Notwithstanding this, there is already partial recognition that on-field and
off-field performances may be linked (e.g., Cornwell et al., 2001). It is within the
measurement of both on-field and off-field performance that grey areas remain,
and the overriding conclusion is that there is currently no set definition as to what
measures to include each time (Plumley et al., 2014). Despite this problem, there
is convergence in certain areas. First, measuring off-field performance is normally
undertaken by conducting financial analysis on the financial statements of clubs.
Under UK accounting law, every limited company must report its financial information in line with the principles and formats of UK Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). As such, financial analysis can be undertaken on
any registered company, particularly in larger organisations such as professional
sports teams where more detailed information is available in a standardised format.
One of the most popular and applied forms of financial measurement is ratio
analysis. The measurement of variables under these headings has been utilised
extensively in academic research, ranging across a variety of industries. Indeed,
Feng and Wang (2000); Ponikvar, Tajnikar, and Pusnik (2009); and Sueyoshi
(2005) have all incorporated similar areas of financial performance, namely debt,
liquidity, and profitability, in their respective analysis of the airline industry, the
American power/energy industry, and the Slovenian manufacturing industry.
With regard to sporting performance, the literature suggests that there is a link
between sporting and financial performance (e.g., Szymanski & Kuypers, 1999),
but there remains a pragmatic problem with the debate surrounding cause and
effect. Most studies that have focused on sporting performance have used “league
position” or “league points won” as a measure for their analysis. Upon correlating
the relationship between profit and league position for 40 football clubs between
the years 1978–1997, Szymanski and Kuypers (1999) found little evidence of a
5
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significant relationship between changes in league position and changes in profit,
implying that there is no simple formula that relates financial success to success
on the pitch. However, as stated by Szymanski and Kuypers (1999), in the past,
when club directors did not place great emphasis on financial success, this did not
matter. In practice, financial performance can be measured by more than just the
profit figure taken from the club accounts, just as playing performance can consist
of a number of different variables in addition to league position. Indeed, Guzman
(2006) claims that professional football clubs are special businesses since their
performance can be viewed from two different objectives; success on the field and
success in business performance. Morrow (2003; cited in Guzman & Morrow,
2007) concurs, agreeing in the first instance that football clubs are unusual businesses. Although generally constituted as limited liability companies and hence
ostensibly operating within the same legal and governance framework as companies in other areas of economic activity, they exist in a peculiar emotional and social space, where unusually strong relationships often exist between the company
and stakeholders. Unsurprisingly, these relationships can have an impact on business behaviour and decision making. For example, the objectives of football clubs,
in particular the desire for on-field success, are likely to have implications for business decision making (Morrow, 2003). In addition, the presence of nonfinancial
objectives also raises the question of how to measure the performance of football
clubs (Guzman & Morrow, 2007) in line with their pursuit of twin objectives that
can potentially conflict with each other. This point is pertinent in respect of a paper by Rascher (1997) who examined the individual owner’s choice of talent, the
league’s choice of revenue-sharing arrangement, and a salary cap policy in both a
profit-maximising model and a utility-maximising model. In a profit-maximising
model, the paper found that owners would be in favour of lowering the salary cap
if it were a sufficiently small or a sufficiently large decrease and that the optimal
revenue-sharing agreement and salary cap level are generally found to be 100%
and 0%, respectively, from the owner’s perspective (Rascher, 1997).
A further consideration in relation to financial performance is the application
of weighting factors to each individual variable or measure. Previously it has been
commonplace for analysts to assign equal weights to all ratios considered in the
analysis. A more robust and scientific technique would be to weight factors of significant importance higher than others. However, there is no set definition for assigning weighting factors and, once again, it is at the discretion of the authors what
weightings are set. Indeed, few academic papers cover this topic. Fadhil Abidali
and Harris (1995) suggest a questionnaire or interview-based approach focusing
on industry experts to determine how variables should be weighted, but there is
very little empirical evidence in relation to this matter.
Key Issues
It is evident that there are many different types of performance measurement
and that each method has its respective strengths and weaknesses. However, it is
6
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apparent from the literature that the choice of ratios is largely down to the discretion of individual researchers rather than rigorously tested scientific protocols.
There is, at the present time, no set definition as to which ratios or variables to use.
In actual fact, it appears that researchers instead opt for certain ratios or variables
that fit best within the context of the study and the industry in which a business
operates. It is important to understand that ratio analysis is also often used as a
benchmarking tool within industries, and it makes good business sense for organisations to benchmark themselves against their direct competitors. However, in
the context of sport, and more specifically professional football, this is difficult to
replicate. For example, both Manchester United and AFC Bournemouth were in
the EPL in the 2015–2016 season, yet it is unrealistic that the two clubs would be
in direct competition in a financial sense. Furthermore, despite the importance of
benchmarking, there is little literature about benchmarking in professional team
sports or indeed football.
In summary, sport is different from other products and industry sectors
(Chadwick, 2009). There is a performance measurement objective of balancing
on-field success with business performance that makes sport so unique and different from other industries. At present, the performance measurement debate is
seen as being one which involves a tension between the effectiveness of on-field
performances and the effectiveness of off-field financial performance (Chadwick,
2009).

Methodology
In this study, the original selection of variables was a consequence of a twostage process. The first, involved a systematic literature review from the lead author’s Ph.D. dissertation that covered search terms for financial performance measurement both in professional sport and general business. The systematic review
returned a total of 80 relevant articles that were analysed from an original total
of 2,635. These articles were then reviewed to extract the measures of financial
performance used across multiple industries (some of which have been discussed
in the literature review section of this paper). The second stage was to finalise
the variables to be used in the first iteration of the model through a discussion
with a panel of experts in the field and through a cross-reference of Deloitte’s suggested key performance indicators (KPIs) for a football club. Through this twostage approach, the authors are confident that the initial variables put forward are
indicative of both the actual performance measures that football clubs objectivise
against and the variables put forward in previous academic research on the topic.
The authors are confident that the selection of variables (both financial and sporting) is rigorous and logical given the academic literature available on the topic
and the context of the industry. First, from a playing perspective we have devised
measures that accurately describe how on-field success (or failure) can be captured easily in a series of indicators that are logical and for which the raw data
7
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is readily available in the public domain and, second, for the financial indicators
we are using industry standard measures that again can be sourced from data in
the public domain and have been justified through a systematic search of relevant
academic literature.
Originally, the neutral model was made up of 18 different variables, 9 financial and 9 sporting, with equal weights applied to each variable (see Table 1). A
definition of each variable and its interpretation is provided in Table 2. Financial
data was gathered from the Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance publications, which use the annual financial statements of the legal entity registered in the
United Kingdom, which is the “top” ownership structure in respect of each club
to produce their figures. Where data was missing from this publication, data was
extracted manually from the company accounts. Sporting data was gathered from
the Sky Sports Football Yearbooks.

Table 1
The Neutral Model in Practice
Dimension
Indicator
Financial

Sporting

8

Revenue
Operating
Profit/(Loss) before
player trading
Pre-tax profit/(loss)
Net
Assets/(Liabilities)
Cash/(bank loans and
overdrafts)
Other loans and
leases
Net funds/(debt)
Wages/Turnover
TV Revenue
League Points
Total Home Games
Total Home Game
Variance
Total Games
Total Game Variance
Total Win Ratio
Perfect Season
Attendance Spread
Revenue per
Average Spectator

Sub domain
League rank

Weight

Score

2
4

0.111
0.111

0.222
0.444

3
8

0.111
0.111

0.333
0.888

4

0.111

0.444

1

0.111

0.111

3
4
3
5
2
1

0.111
0.111
0.111
0.111
0.111
0.111

0.333
0.444
0.333
0.555
0.222
0.111

4
6
8
11
4
3

0.111
0.111
0.111
0.111
0.111
0.111

0.444
0.666
0.888
1.221
0.444
0.333

Dimension
Score
Weight

3.552

Overall
Score
(OPS)

0.50

4.218

4.884

0.50

9

Table 2
Neutral Model Variable Definitions and Interpretations
Dimension
Financial

Indicator
Revenue
Operating Profit/(Loss) before player
trading
Pre-tax profit/(loss)
Net Assets/(Liabilities)
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Cash/(bank loans and overdrafts)
Other loans and leases
Net funds/(debt)
Wages/Turnover
TV Revenue
Sporting

League Points
Total Home Games
Total Home Game Variance
Total Games
Total Game Variance

Total Win Ratio
Perfect Season

Attendance Spread

Revenue per Average Spectator

Definition
A club's total revenue figure taken from the first line of the income
statement.
A club's operating profit/(loss) before player trading is accounted for.
A club's profit/(loss) before any tax charges are deducted.
A figure to show whether a club has more positive net assets or negative
liabilities.
A figure to show whether a club has a positive cash figure or whether it is
more reliant on bank loans/overdrafts.
A figure to show any other loans or leases a club has.
A figure to show whether a club has positive net funds or debt.
A figure to show the percentage of turnover that is spent on staff wages
A figure to show how much income a club receives from TV broadcasting
deals
The amount of points a club acquires through sporting performance in a
given season
The total number of home games a club plays in a given season. This will
fluctuate in line with performance in cup competitions.
The difference between the fixed number of home games a club is
guaranteed to play versus the actual number they play (fixed home games in
the EPL is 19 per club).
The total number of games a club plays in any given season. A higher
number typically indicates more sporting success.
The difference between the fixed number of games a club is guaranteed to
play versus the actual number they play (fixed games in the EPL is 40 per
club (38 in the league plus a guaranteed 2 games in domestic cup
competitions).
A ratio that considers the amount of wins a club achieves against the total
number of games played in any given season.
The total number of games played should a club win every trophy possible
and play in every round of the cup competitions (perfect season in the EPL is
defined as 63 games (winning all four trophies of league, FA Cup, League
Cup and Champions League). Perfect season is expressed as a ratio of total
games played.
The difference between highest and lowest league match attendances
expressed as an absolute figure. A low percentage score might indicate
capacity constraints and robust match day revenue streams whereas a high
percentage might indicate a more fragile fan base and more dependence on
the quality of the visiting team.
The figure for revenue per average spectator is derived from calculating a
club's revenue less Premier League TV revenues and UEFA central TV
distributions divided by the average league attendance. This figure represents
a 'broad measure' of a club's ability to generate revenue from its fan base.

Interpretation
Higher figure is more desirable.
Higher figure is more desirable.
Higher figure is more desirable.
Higher figure is more desirable.
Higher figure is more desirable.
Lower figure is more desirable.
Higher figure is more desirable.
Lower figure is more desirable.
Higher figure is more desirable.
Higher figure is more desirable.
Higher figure is more desirable.
Higher figure is more desirable.
Higher figure is more desirable.
Higher figure is more desirable.

Higher figure is more desirable.
Higher figure is more desirable.

Lower figure is more desirable.

Higher figure is more desirable.

Holistic Performance of EPL Clubs

The neutral model takes its origins from the FOrNeX model (see Andrikopolous & Kaimenakis, 2009), which outlines a way to model the intellectual capital
of a football club. For each dimension of performance (financial and sporting)
a weight is assigned which sums to 1. The performance of the football club is
the weighted average of the performance in both these dimensions. Within these
two dimensions of performance, there are a number of indicators that are also
weighted and sum to 1, so each club has a dimension score for each sub-domain
(using the Hypothetical league rank column), which is then used to calculate the
overall performance score for each club. The league rank for each sub-domain is
derived from how well a club is performing in relation to other clubs in the league
on that indicator. For each sub-domain, the league rank will range from 1 (best
performance) to n (worst performance)—the latter is categorised by how many
teams compete in the league. Therefore, a team with the best turnover figure in a
given year will score 1; the team with the second best turnover figure will score 2,
and so on. The multiplication of the scores and subsequent overall performance
score (OPS) is described in Table 1. A lower OPS is more desirable owing to the
fact that clubs are ranked against each other (i.e., the perfect score for each indicator would be 1).
Alterations to the Neutral Model
After the completion of the pilot study, further alterations to the model were
made in an attempt to define which factors were most important within the neutral
model. The statistical analysis method utilised was factor analysis. In this research,
factor analysis was underpinned by an initial correlation matrix, which provides
an opportunity to eliminate variables from the investigation where certain variables correlate highly and essentially measure the same thing. A very strong correlation (either positively or negatively) is deemed to be an r score of greater than
0.7. The correlation matrixes for both financial and sporting variables are outlined
in Tables 3 and 4.
The Model Restated—The PAM
Following correlation analysis on the neutral model ten variables (four financial and six sporting) were omitted owing to very strong correlations with other
variables (variables shaded grey in Tables 3 and 4). Where multiple correlations
occurred, a logical rationale was provided as to the exclusion of certain variables.
A financial variable example of this was to include “revenue” over “TV revenue”
owing to the fact that the TV revenue figure is a complete subset of the total revenue figure and therefore total revenue is deemed to be the better variable for
inclusion in the model. A sporting variable example was to include “total game
variance” over “total home game variance” for similar reasons.

10
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Table 3
Correlation Matrix (Financial)
Revenue
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Correlation

Sig. (1tailed)

Revenue
Operating Profit
Pre-Tax Profit
Net
Assets/(Liabilities)
Cash/(bank loans and
overdrafts)
Other Loans
Net Funds/(Debt)
Wages/Turnover
TV Revenue

.239

Revenue

.163

Operating Profit
Pre-Tax Profit
Net
Assets/(Liabilities)
Cash/(bank loans and
overdrafts)
Other Loans
Net Funds/(Debt)
Wages/Turnover
TV Revenue

a. Determinant = 5.440E-005
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed)





Operating
Profit

PreTax
Profit
-.389
.432


Net
Assets/(Liabilities)
.219
.574
.453

Cash/(bank
loans and
overdrafts)
-.009
-.270
.240
-.111

Other
Loans

Net
Funds/(Debt)

Wages/Turnover

TV
Revenue

-.704
.089
.411
.082

-.602
.114
.623
.202

.295
.925
.433
.632

.807
.100
-.504
.054

-.077

.346

-.149

-.209

.830

.154
.188

-.588
-.596
.002
.000**

.050

.184

.486

.000**

.003**

.110

.033

.005**

.132

.358

.321

.000**

.342

.026

.161

.040*

.002**

.032*

.014*

.369

.204

.002**

.412

.377

.074

.271

.196

.326

.000**

.264

.004**

.221

.004**
.497
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Once the variables had been reduced, they were weighted according to their
respective importance to the model. The restated model is subsequently referred
to as the Performance Assessment Model (PAM). The restated PAM (Table 5) also
uses a justified weighting system that takes into account the different measures
in the model as well as current regulations in the industry. For example, wages/
turnover is an efficiency measure (i.e., it is composed of two variables to create
one measure). It is also a component of FFP with UEFA stating a suggested wages/
turnover ratio as a benchmark for clubs. The measure is therefore allocated greater
weight (0.4) within the PAM. A further reason behind this decision was the relationship between the three original models that were derived (the neutral model
and two PAMs with different weighting factors). Correlation analysis of the results
obtained in each model (the results of one year’s worth of data for 19 clubs) found
a strong relationship between the results for all three models, essentially identifying that all three models were stating identical results. The correlation r score
between the results returned for the neutral model, the PAM (equal weights) and
the PAM (justified weights) was 0.980 and 0.979 respectively while the r score
between the two PAMs was 0.997.

Table 5
The PAM (Justfied Weights)
Dimension

Sub domain
Indicator

Financial

Sporting

League
rank

Dimension
Weight

Score

Revenue

2

0.15

0.30

Pre-tax profit/(loss)

4

0.15

0.60

Net assets/(liabilities)

3

0.15

0.45

Net funds/(debt)

8

0.15

1.20

Wages/Turnover

4

0.40

1.60

League Points

5

0.333

1.665

Total Game Variance

2

0.333

0.666

Attendance Spread

1

0.333

0.333

Score

Weight

4.15

0.625

2.66

0.375

OPS

3.59

Results
Applying the PAM—An Analysis of English Football Clubs since the Inception
of the EPL
The paper now applies the PAM to a longitudinal dataset of English football
clubs that have competed predominantly within the EPL since its inception in
12
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1992. The results include data from 21 clubs in total (the selected clubs were the
clubs that had spent the most seasons in the EPL at the time of data collection
[2012]). However, the results have since been updated to include the most recent
set of figures available at the time of writing (2012/13 season) meaning that performance has been analysed over a period of 21 years for 21 clubs.

Table 6
Average OPS for All Clubs 1993–2013
Rank

Club

Average
Finance Score

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Manchester United
Arsenal
Tottenham Hotspur
Liverpool
Newcastle United
Chelsea
Aston Villa
Leeds United
West Ham United
Everton
Manchester City
Southampton
Sunderland
Bolton Wanderers
Leicester City
Charlton Athletic
Sheffield Wednesday
Blackburn Rovers
Middlesbrough
Fulham
Coventry City

2.89
6.20
5.10
8.27
9.48
11.79
9.30
9.36
10.72
11.49
12.23
11.75
10.26
12.55
12.79
13.17
11.26
14.24
14.81
16.25
15.57

Average
Sporting
Score
3.08
3.65
8.16
6.30
7.86
5.71
12.24
12.81
11.37
11.97
10.79
12.17
14.71
12.13
13.51
13.03
16.32
11.40
11.95
11.67
15.25

Average OPS
2.96
5.24
6.25
7.53
8.87
9.51
10.40
10.65
10.96
11.67
11.69
11.91
11.93
12.39
13.06
13.12
13.16
13.17
13.74
14.53
15.45

Table 6 indicates that Manchester United is the best performing club
on average. The club has recorded one of the largest net debt figures in recent
years (primarily due to the levels of borrowing attached to the takeover of the
club by the Glazer family in 2005) but its ability to generate revenue and profit
remains unrivalled, and its position at the top of the EPL and historically strong
performance in both domestic and European cup competitions consolidates its
position as the best performing club in England. A similar scenario can be found
at Arsenal, although its net debt figure has been one of the highest across all clubs
since 2003. This debt must be considered in context, however. It was in large part
due to the construction of a new stadium, which was necessary to help Arsenal
bridge the gap to clubs with higher attendances such as Manchester United. Despite
Chelsea ranking third for sporting performance, the club ranked sixth in relation
13
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to the overall performance owing to poorer financial performance, where the club
ranked 13th. The three worst performing clubs in the study were Middlesbrough,
Fulham, and Coventry City (see Table 6).
Figure 1 examines the relationship between financial and sporting performance over 21 seasons. Here a club’s average financial score is plotted against its
average sporting score. Figure 1 offers insights into how well English professional
football clubs have performed against their closest competitors when also faced
with the tension of the twin objectives of sports teams of winning and profitmaking, which Smith and Stewart (2010) define as one of the special features of
sport. In the United States, there is still no definitive conclusion as to whether
teams are profit maximisers where the balance sheet rules, or utility maximisers
where a high win-loss ratio is the true measure of superior performance (Fort &
Quirk, 2004). As such, it is difficult to frame Figure 1 within a profit versus utility
maximisation debate. Profit and utility maximisation ultimately represent motivations and there is not a unique relationship between motivation and outcome. For
example, poor financial performance does not necessarily imply utility maximisation. Sport organisations share the same imperative in relation to having to pay
wages to invest in the development of player talent in order to achieve winning
performances that not only satisfy the shareholders and investors but also to keep
the public interested and willing to pay for its product (Syzmanski & Kuypers,
1999). Put simply, success is a function of a strong stream of revenue (Smith &
Stewart, 2010). In relation to our findings, Figure 1 certainly supports this theory.
Manchester United has been the most consistent performer across the elite
clubs in England since the formation of the EPL when analysed through the PAM.
The top right hand quadrant indicated in Figure 1 highlights occurrences where a
club is performing well both financially and on the pitch in relation to its competitors. Past research (e.g., Buraimo et al., 2006; Dobson & Goddard, 2011) has stated
that occurrences like this have been rare in recent years and, superficially, Figure 1
offers a similar conclusion. Aside from Manchester United, only three other clubs
are placed in the top right quadrant (Arsenal, Liverpool, and Tottenham Hotspur).
Furthermore, all of these three clubs are closer to other quadrants than being
closer to Manchester United. Tottenham Hotspur’s financial performance is the
closest challenger to Manchester United, while Arsenal is the closest in terms of
sporting performance. It is arguably conceivable that large-market teams such as
Manchester United could pursue profit maximisation and still rank highly in both
sporting and financial performance. The same could be said for a number of other
clubs, including Arsenal and, more recently, Chelsea and Manchester City. With
reference to the data for this study, Chelsea is one of only two clubs located in the
top left quadrant of Figure 1 indicating relatively good sporting performance but
relatively poor financial performance.
Chelsea was one of the first clubs to be taken over by a new wave of foreign investors when Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich purchased the club in 2003
14
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Figure 1. Average Financial Performance versus Average Sporting Performance 1993-2013
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and recent literature has argued that this club has subsequently been following an
approach most closely related to utility maximisation (Wilson et al., 2013). While
it is impossible to say whether this is true or not, in light of the subjectivity surrounding profit and utility maximisation, the data does depict a trade-off between
financial and sporting performance for Chelsea at a time when the owner was attempting to strengthen playing talent to drive success on the pitch.
Of more cause for concern for English football clubs is the fact that 13 of the
21 clubs in the study are placed in the bottom left quadrant of Figure 1. In essence,
this quadrant depicts clubs performing insufficiently in all areas of measurement
compared with their competitors in the industry. Hypothetically, this quadrant
supports the aforementioned “financial crisis” in English football (see Buraimo
et al., 2006) with certain clubs displaying neither good financial performance nor
reporting any significant success on the pitch. In relation to the PAM, the worst
performing clubs would be placed furthest toward the bottom left corner of Figure
1, meaning that Fulham, Coventry City, and Sheffield Wednesday can be categorised as the worst performing clubs overall in relation to the years analysed. It
must be noted that some of these clubs (e.g., Coventry City, Sheffield Wednesday,
and Leeds United) have been relegated from the EPL in recent years and are yet to
return. However, it is also interesting to note that there are also some established
EPL teams that are placed in this quadrant. Indeed, seven clubs in this quadrant
are current EPL clubs at the time of writing (2014–2015 season), including Everton, which is one of only seven clubs that have competed in every EPL season
since its formation in 1992. Additionally, Figure 1 highlights that financial performance and sporting performance are not mutually exclusive as there are occurrences where clubs have recorded good financial performance and good sporting
performance (e.g., Manchester United).
Last, Figure 1 also indicates that there is a positive correlation between financial performance and sporting performance (r = 0.44). While this is not a strong
correlation in absolute terms, it is statistically significant (p < 0.05), which means
that the probability of achieving a correlation coefficient of this magnitude by
chance is remote. This in turn indicates the presence of a real relationship rather
than a statistical quirk. Superficially at least, better financial health is moderately
and positively associated with better performance in the EPL. This is a finding
that is consistent with Wilson et al. (2013) who also found a similar moderate and
positive relationship between financial and sporting performance in EPL clubs.
Time Series Analysis and Correlation Over Time
Figure 2 records the variability in overall performance for all clubs for the
time period analysed by considering their highest and lowest scores and the variance. The unshaded bars show clubs that have recorded an improvement in performance based on their score in 1993 compared with their score in 2013, whereas
the shaded bars show clubs that have seen a decline in performance. There is a
high level of variability in relation to overall performance for the majority of clubs
16
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Figure 2. Overall Performance Variability 1993–2013
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although this time the main variance is between the highest and lowest scores.
This suggests that these clubs have experienced both positive and negative fluctuations between the years 1993–2013. Indeed, this is certainly the case at Manchester City and Newcastle United. Manchester City recorded a best score of 7.91 in
2012 and a worst score of 17.56 in 1998. There was a greater disparity in the scores
recorded by Newcastle United, with the club recording a best score of 2.66 in 1997
and a worst score of 16.28 in 2010. These findings also suggest that football club
performance often runs in cycles, where sometimes clubs have a successful period
spanning a number of years before declining for a period of time.
The smallest variances in performance occur at Coventry City, Manchester
United, and Tottenham Hotspur, although in the case of Coventry City this cannot necessarily be classed as a positive outcome as the club never recorded an
OPS higher than 13.41. In the case of Manchester United and Tottenham Hotspur,
smaller variances were attributable to consistently good OPS scores with all scores
for both clubs falling between 1 and 8 for 18 of the 21 seasons analysed. With reference to Figure 2, it is evident that there is no clear pattern emerging over time
in relation to performance. There are certain instances where a club returns an
annual OPS that differs significantly from its average OPS (e.g., Chelsea in 1999,
Leeds United in 2003 and 2004, Sunderland in 2001, Bolton Wanderers in 2005,
2006 and 2007, and Sheffield Wednesday in 1993) but these occurrences appear
to be random rather than attributable to specific critical incidents. In order to test
this assumption, further scrutiny of the time series analysis is considered through
the correlation between overall performance and time for each club.
The correlation analysis (see Figure 3) illustrates that, with the passage of
time, comparative overall performance has declined either moderately or strongly
for four clubs—Aston Villa, Leicester City, Manchester United, and Newcastle
United (0.30 < r < 0.71 )—while five clubs have improved either moderately or
strongly —Manchester City, Tottenham, Arsenal, Everton, and Fulham (-0.62 < r
< -0.32). For the remaining 12 clubs, performance was relatively unchanged (-0.30
< r < 0.30). This provides further indicative evidence that, for the majority of these
clubs, overall performance, as measured using a mix of financial and sporting indicators, varies over time in cycles.

Discussion
The results suggest that performance is not evenly distributed and that there is
in fact a considerable disparity between the best performing clubs and the worst.
For instance, there is a substantial gap between the best performing club (Manchester United) and the worst performing club (Coventry). Furthermore, there is
a substantial gap between the best performing club (Manchester United) and the
next best performing club (Arsenal). There is an argument here that Manchester
United had, over the period under review, established a form of a monopoly over
the rest of the league, a scenario that Dobson and Goddard (2011) state is not ben18
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Figure 3. Overall Performance Correlations Over Time 1993–2013
eficial for a football club or indeed the league as a whole. The EPL, however, does
not appear to be hindered by this particular situation and it has established itself
as a highly successful product, becoming the largest revenue generating league in
world football during the last five years (Deloitte, 2015).
It is important not to dismiss the argument of Zimbalist (2003), who stated
that, in relation to American team sports, it is almost certain that different owners
give different weights to the variety of arguments in their objective management
functions. This point was also made earlier in the paper in relation to the EPL and
the fact that clubs’ objectives will undoubtedly change over time, making arguments around profit versus utility maximisation increasingly difficult to contextualise with reference to the modern industry of professional team sports.
The Problem with Objectives
It has been acknowledged in this paper that sports teams have to balance twin
objectives (in this case these are financial and sporting objectives). There is a clear
argument to support this in the academic literature that has preceded this paper.
However, the authors are also aware that there are other factors that determine
the objectives of professional sports teams that will subsequently impact on business and sporting performance. Primarily, in professional football clubs, there is
a pragmatic problem with the objectives of owners. Indeed, this is further compounded by the fact that new owners might come into a club and that as a consequence business objectives might change over time. This is evidenced by the case
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of Chelsea, Manchester City, and Manchester United in English football. When
Roman Abramovich purchased Chelsea FC in 2003 (at a time when there were no
restrictions) he primarily invested money into securing the best playing talent in
an attempt to improve sporting performance. A similar scenario occurred at Manchester City in 2008 when they were purchased by the Abu Dhabi Group, although
the introduction of FFP has since meant that Manchester City must now balance
the books as well. The acquisition of Manchester United in 2005 by the Glazer
family was slightly different as they purchased the club through a method of debt
finance. It was suggested at the time that this was the first example of an American
owner exerting profit maximisation principles on a UK professional sports team
and Manchester United have since floated on the Singapore and New York stock
exchange in an attempt to raise further funds.
Given this context, it is difficult to ascertain indefinitely what the objectives
of clubs truly are. However, we are not necessarily trying to say that clubs are
profit maximisers or utility maximisers, rather that they show the traits of these
extremes to a greater or lesser extent. This issue is easily solved by examining
the likes of Chelsea, Manchester City, and Manchester United to show how (if at
all) things change is response to critical incidents. Notwithstanding the practical
problem of owner objectives, it is clear from previous literature that success (in
team sports) is a function of a strong stream of revenue (Smith & Stewart, 2010)
primarily because teams have to pay the best wages to secure the best playing talent. As such, irrespective of what owner(s) actually wants to do, they must balance
the financial and sporting objectives of the club accordingly in order to maximise
playing success.

Conclusion
The contribution to the paper is twofold. First, the paper offers insights into
the holistic performance of professional football clubs in England over a longitudinal time period. Among other things, the paper offers new and relevant insights
into the economic theory of professional team sports most notably around the
relationship between financial and sporting performance , thus building on the
seminal work of Sloane (1971) and others (e.g. Kesenne, 2000; Garcia-del-Barro
and Szymanski, 2006; Sloane, 2015). Our findings suggest that financial and sporting performance are not dichotomous variables but a continuum along which
clubs place themselves and move backwards and forwards to a greater or lesser
extent.
Secondly, the paper has developed a robust statistically tested model that can
be used to conduct data analysis over longitudinal time periods. This new model
also has the potential to be applied to other professional team sports to investigate
league characteristics in future research. The model adds progression in the field,
as previously the choice of variables used has been discretionary and has not been
tempered by tests for covariance. By contrast, the PAM has been developed using
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recognised statistical techniques to inform its production and to minimise covariance. As outlined in the introduction, the aim of such a model is not to attempt to
predict future performance but to pinpoint health markers to ascertain warning
signs for when clubs may appear to be performing badly. The model can be used to
quantify club objectives and help analysts outline in what way clubs are performing based on economic principles. The model could also be used by governing
bodies and decision makers within respective sports in order to inform policy and
set new regulations.
Limitations and Future Research
While this paper has focused explicitly on the twin objectives of professional
sports teams, the authors acknowledge that there are perhaps multiple objectives
of professional sports teams that transcend financial and sporting performance.
Indeed, a recent paper by Carlsson-Wall, Kraus, and Messner (2016) indicates
that football clubs operate under multiple institutional logics, citing the work of
Gammelsaeter (2010), who states that sports organisations are typically subject
to several different logics. Notwithstanding this, Carlsson-Wall et al. (2016) also
proceed to focus on two logics in their paper that they term sports logic and business logic respectively. These two logics are the same as the financial and sporting
performance objectives that we use in our paper, thus outlining their continued
importance in the performance measurement of professional sports teams.
As such, the omission of other performance measures or logics is a limitation of the current study, although it also presents a natural direction for future
research. The model put forward in this paper is scientifically robust enough to
stand up to scrutiny but is by no means perfect. Thus, progression of the model
to incorporate different institutional logics is an area for future research development. Furthermore, a refinement of the model is possible through interviewing
industry professionals to test whether the variables used are consistent with internal performance indicators. It is envisaged that the variables used in this paper
would be confirmed to some extent through this approach given the systematic
rigour applied to this paper, although it would provide an interesting qualitative
aspect to the research agenda if interviews could be sourced with owners and chief
executives to help us understand further the thought process behind setting performance objectives in football clubs.
A future quantitative research stream is to apply the model to other professional football leagues and other professional team sports. The aim would be to
create a body of research in different sports that enables meaningful cross sport
comparisons to be made and thereby contribute further to research into professional team sports. As Smith and Stewart (2010) highlight, sport has special features that demand a customised set of practices to ensure its effective operation. It
is much more than just a business and is influenced by its rich history, emotional
connections, tribal links, and social relevance. Factors such as these are difficult
to objectively measure yet they will have a bearing on the business performance
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of sporting teams. We have put forward a model that builds on previous research
and provides a composite index score for financial and sporting performance. The
application and expansion of the model across different sports would provide further enhancements to the field.
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